Carleton’s treatment of Sam Tsega cries of unfairness, and runs contrary to the constitutional presumption of innocence. How could a university, whose aim is to teach its students to think critically and rationally, make such an emotional and arbitrary decision in the absence of any evidence of a threat posed by the student?
Tsega was charged with a very serious offence. In 2010, a judge released him on bail finding that he did not pose a threat to society.
He was placed on house arrest with the exception of going to school. This is all a matter of public record. He enrolled at Carleton, and is now in his third year and a member of the lacrosse team. However, Carleton recently decided to suspend him because he has an outstanding charge.
This decision strikes at the core of the presumption of innocence.
We generally want to see criminals punished and sent to jail. On the other hand, it is contrary to our sense of liberty and freedom to punish or imprison prior to any finding of guilt.
This brings us to the real issue—does a charge represent a threat? There is a segment in society that adopts an emotional, negative, and visceral perception against those charged with serious offences. They want to ensure the public is protected, and see criminals in prison and punished severely.
For this group, to get rid of a “criminal” is to get rid of crime. They perceive the courts as too indulgent, too good to the criminal. But, if this were the case, persons charged with certain offences would never be released because of the negative perception towards the type of alleged offence, while others would almost automatically be released where the perception is neutral or more indulgent.
This perception is not only improper for the courts, but also for institutions like Carleton. As one judge aptly held, “the criminal law and its application has, and must have, an educational value for the public. An informed public must understand that the existence of the presumption of innocence at all stages of the . . . process is not . . . purely theoretical, but a concrete reality.” This is the essence of a democratic society.
An informed public understands that there exists a constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence and the right to move within society while awaiting trial.
Undoubtedly, there are those alleged to have committed serious crimes who, although presumed innocent, pose a serious threat to safety. For this reason, we have a system that weighs evidence of risk, harm, and safety. Beyond the charge itself, courts consider factors like the person’s past, their associates, the plan of release, and their alleged role in the alleged offence, to name a few.
We cannot presume that the justice system has made an arbitrary decision. We expect the courts to sift through evidence and come to a reasoned decision about our safety and security. Why should we expect anything less from Carleton, a leading academic institution?
Ironically, before Carleton suspended Tsega, the prosecution and court agreed to relax his bail conditions taking him off house arrest and allowing him to travel with the lacrosse team.
Who is better placed to decide whether Sam Tsega poses a threat to the student body? A court of law having heard the evidence, or university management reacting to an unconfirmed media report?
The court has spoken. Why isn’t that good enough for Carleton? Regrettably, Carleton’s decision stands in stark contrast to the values and principles that society expects from an institution of higher learning.
